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In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., the
Supreme Court addressed the antirust claim of "predatory bidding"-i.e.,
that a manufacturer paid too much for an "input" that is used in the
production process.' Although the Ninth Circuit allowed predatory-bidding
liability to be based on the jury's subjective estimation that the defendant
paid more than "necessary" for an input, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that predatory-bidding plaintiffs would have to satisfy the
objective, two-part test from Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp.2 instead: that (i) the alleged predatory bidding caused the
defendant to operate at a loss; and (ii) the defendant had a dangerous
probability of recouping its losses in the predatory scheme.' Otherwise, the
Court explained, there would be a "serious". "risk of chilling
procompetitive behavior."4
Weyerhaeuser is sure to have a significant impact in antitrust cases. In
particular, Weyerhaeuser is expected to limit predatory-bidding claims and
to help promote the development of objective standards in antitrust
* Nickolai G. Levin is an associate in the Washington, DC, office of Mayer Brown LLP
who has helped represent several antitrust and punitive damages defendants in the Supreme
Court, including Weyerhaeuser in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co.,
127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (antitrust), and Philip Morris in Philip Morris U.S.A. v. Williams, 127 S.
Ct. 1057 (2007) (punitive damages). I would like to thank Evan Tager, Andrew Frey, Emil
Kleinhaus, Rhett Martin, and Robert Kry for their helpful comments and suggestions. The
views expressed herein are my own and do not represent the views of Mayer Brown LLP or any
client I have represented.
1. 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
2. 509 U.S 209 (1993)
3. 127 S. Ct at 1078.
4. Id.
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cases -something the Antitrust Division of the United States Department
of Justice has deemed a "priority."6
But the concern about overdeterrence that animated Weyerhaeuser is
not limited to the antitrust context, and therefore the teachings of the
decision should not be either. The risk of chilling beneficial conduct
through application of a highly subjective liability standard-the problem
that arose in Weyerhaeuser-is potentially much more serious in the
punitive damages context than it is in antitrust cases. After all, many
standards governing tort liability, liability for punitive damages, and
punitive amount are just as subjective as the jury instruction in
Weyerhaeuser,7 yet the amount at stake in a punitive damages case is
potentially much higher than "treble damages" (i.e., a punitive damages
award two times the amount of compensatory damages).
Here, I explain that, whereas the subjective jury instruction affirmed
by the Ninth Circuit in Weyerhaeuser was widely and immediately treated
with scorn in the antitrust community-the government derided it,' a
leading antitrust commentator called it "an antitrust disaster of enormous
proportions,"9 and even one of plaintiffs experts called it "too vague""-
equally problematic instructions are affirmed every day in the punitive
damages context without any seeming concern. As punitive awards in the
billions continue to persist, ll this jurisprudential disparity cannot be
ignored.
I. WEYERHAEUSER AS AN ANTITRUST ANOMALY
The facts in Weyerhaeuser were pretty straightforward. Weyerhaeuser
and one of its competitors, Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. (Ross-
Simmons), operated sawmills in the Pacific Northwest at which they
5. See, e.g., Nickolai G. Levin, Weyerhaeuser's Implications for Future Antitrust Disputes, 3
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. (forthcoming 2007).
6. Thomas Barnett, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Enforcement Priorities: A Year
in Review, Address Before the ABA Fall Forum in Washington, D.C., Nov. 19, 2004, at 3, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206455.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) ("[j]ury instructions typically
leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts").
8. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 2006 WL 2452373, at 12 & n.3.
9. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Exclusionary Pricing, in 2 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 21, 37
(Spring 2006).
10. Comments of John Kirkwood, United States Federal Trade Commission and United States
Department of Justice, Sherman Act Section 2, Joint Hearing, Predatory Pricing, at 105 (June 22, 2006),
available at http://www.flc.gov/os/sectiontwoheanngs/docs/60622FTC.pdf.
11. E.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.2d 600, 625 (9th Cir. 2006) ($2.5 billion in punitive damages
allowed for Exxon Valdez Tanker disaster); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 413 F. Supp. 2d 346




bought alder saw logs and processed them into alder lumber. From 1990 to
2000, Weyerhaeuser invested over $75 million to upgrade its production
facilities in the Pacific Northwest. "By contrast, Ross-Simmons appears to
have engaged in little efficiency-enhancing investment."' 2  Not
surprisingly, Weyerhaeuser's business grew-some evidence suggested
that, by 2001, it purchased approximately 65% of the alder logs available
for sale in the region-while Ross-Simmons's business faltered.
After Ross-Simmons went out of business in 2001, it blamed
Weyerhaeuser for "bidding up" sawlog costs and sued Weyerhaeuser for
monopolization and attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman
Act. 3  In particular, "Ross-Simmons argued that Weyerhaeuser had
overpaid for alder sawlogs to cause sawlog prices to rise to artificially high
levels as part of a plan to drive Ross-Simmons out of business. As proof
that this practice had occurred, Ross-Simmons pointed to Weyerhaeuser's
large share of the alder purchasing market, rising alder sawlog prices [from
1996 to 2001], and Weyerhaeuser's declining profits during the same
period."' 4
At trial, the court instructed the jury that it could find Weyerhaeuser's
conduct anticompetitive if it concluded that Weyerhaeuser "purchased
more logs than it needed, or paid a higher price for logs than necessary, in
order to prevent [Ross-Simmons] from obtaining the logs they needed at a
fair price."'" Following testimony suggesting that Weyerhaeuser had the
power to influence log prices, the jury found that Weyerhaeuser had
monopolized or attempted to monopolize the upstream alder saw log
market and returned a verdict for over $26 million, which was later trebled
to approximately $79 million.' 6 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the instruction adequately stated the law and that there was sufficient
evidence of overbidding. 17
This ruling was highly suspect. The Supreme Court had denounced
antitrust standards that threaten to "inhibit management's exercise of
independent business judgment" because of the risk of jury error for more
than twenty years.' 8 And just recently the Court had reiterated that "[t]he
cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of [liability for
monopolization]."' 9
Well-known scholars were harshly, and immediately, critical.
12. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1072 (2007).




17. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 411 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th
Cir. 2005).
18. Monsanto Co v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
19. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004).
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Professor Steve Salop stated that "such an amorphous 'fair price' standard
is not an adequate benchmark for courts or juries to accurately determine
whether a defendant predatorily overbought or overpaid. 'More than
needed' and 'higher price than necessary' are vague standards ... Thus,
this standard raises a high risk of false positives because it cannot
distinguish between price increases resulting from vigorous competition
versus predation." ° Professor Herbert Hovenkamp criticized the decision
more pointedly. He wrote that "[t]he jury instruction that the Ninth Circuit
approved is an antitrust disaster of enormous proportions. .. . Large buyers
subject to Ninth Circuit law now operate under the threat that if they bid
too aggressively for some scarce input a jury will find that they paid 'more
than necessary' and subject them to treble damages liability. There is no
obvious reason for thinking this will be a rare occurrence. Some kind of
standard with more substance is essential.,
21
Business groups also were alarmed and supported Weyerhaeuser's
petition for certiorari en masse. For instance, the United States Chamber of
Commerce argued that "the standard [the Ninth Circuit] endorsed-
whether Weyerhaeuser paid more than a 'fair' price for the logs it
purchased to produce lumber, and whether it purchased more logs than it
'needed'-poses a serious risk of false positives.' 22 Likewise, the Business
Roundtable and National Association of Manufacturers stated that "[t]he
Ninth Circuit adopted a dangerous and unworkable rule that subjects
purchasing decisions of businesses throughout the Nation to judicial
oversight as to whether a company purchased more inputs 'than it needed'
or paid more 'than necessary' for them,... [a] holding, if not corrected,
would deter companies from making efficient purchasing decisions to
adjust to rapidly evolving market conditions., 23 And even timber sellers-
the purported future victims of Weyerhaeuser's acquisition of monopsony
power (monopoly power in the buying side of the market)-asserted that:
The Ninth Circuit's decision is not merely out of step with decisions of
the other courts of appeals and standard principles of antitrust law. It
also throws a judicial monkey wrench into the machinery of
competition. By licensing juries to substitute their assessment of a
"fair" price and the "necessity" of purchases for the discipline of the
competitive market-without any showing that the defendant's conduct
was unprofitable or would result in the recovery of monopoly profits-
the decision chills price competition among purchasers of inputs.
20. Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 714
(2005).
21. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 37.
22. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and the American Forest
and Paper Ass'n as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), 2005 WL 2822909.
23. Brief of The Bus. Roundtable and the Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 3, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), 2005 WL 2822908.
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Exposed to the threat of treble-damages actions for paying "too much"
for needed inputs, purchasers will necessarily curtail their bids.24
Following this showing, the Court sought the government's views on
whether certiorari should be granted. Recognizing the almost universal
condemnation of the predatory-bidding instruction in Weyerhaeuser, the
government supported certiorari and reversal, stating that "the chilling
effect of the court of appeals' decision may extend beyond the context of
predatory bidding. To the extent that the court of appeals approved jury
instructions that dispensed with any objective standard for distinguishing
predation from aggressive competition, the court of appeals' decision
encourages the utilization of equally vague and standardless jury
instructions in other [monopolization and attempted monopolization]
cases."
25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari soon thereafter.26 The list of
distinguished individuals criticizing the instruction only grew in number.
Most notably, several respected law professors and economists filed amicus
briefs supporting reversal. The law professors called the instruction
"deeply flawed., 27 And the economists stated that "it is neither appropriate
nor feasible simply to ask a jury to determine whether a firm bought more
than it 'needed' or paid more than 'necessary.' These are portmanteau
expressions that cannot be unpacked analytically, standardless words with
no basis in economic reasoning .... This case [] illustrates the kind of false
positive that is a probable outcome of applying the unbounded and vague
legal standard approved by the Court of Appeals. 28
The Supreme Court appears to have endorsed these arguments in the
Weyerhaeuser opinion. Stating that "[t]here are myriad legitimate
reasons-ranging from benign to affirmatively procompetitive-why a
buyer might bid up input prices, 29 the Court agreed that the applicable
standard had to protect against false positives. The Court required
plaintiffs to prove that any alleged overbidding led the defendant to operate
at a loss-the objective standard from Brooke Group-because a more "lax
[] liability standard," such as that adopted by the lower courts, would create
a "serious". "risk of chilling procompetitive behavior."3 °  Because the
plaintiffs could not meet the objective Brooke Group standard, the Court
24. Bnef of The Campbell Group et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4 Weyerhaeuser,
127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), 2005 WL 2844939.
25. Bnef of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.
Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), 2006 WL 1491286.
26. 126 S. Ct. 714 (2005).
27. Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, Weyerhaeuser, 127 S.
Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), 2006 WL, 2459516.
28. Brief of Economists as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11-13, (citation omitted)
Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007) (No. 05-381), 2006 WL 2459522.
29. Weyerhaeuser, 127 S. Ct. at 1077.
30. Id. at 1078.
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vacated the judgment.3
II. THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES CONTRAST
Concerns about overdeterrence should be equally prevalent in the
context of tort law, and, in particular, punitive damages law. But,
curiously, courts and commentators have been slow in recognizing the
parallel.
While the Supreme Court has urged courts reviewing a punitive
damages award to consider whether a "lesser deterrent" might suffice,32 and
some courts and commentators have emphasized the importance of
protecting against "overdeterrence, '3 3 the great mass of courts and
31. Id. The Court reiterated its concern for overdeterrence in antitrust cases in two other decisions
decided in the 2007 term, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), and Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). In Twombly, the Court explained that the risk
of chilling a "wide swath" of "rational and competitive business strategy" has caused the Court to set
standards that "hedge[] against false inferences . at a number of points in the trial sequence." 127 S
Ct. at 1959. In Billing, the Court claimed that
[A]ntitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes [compared to
regulators]. And the threat of antitrust mistakes, i.e., results that stray outside the
narrow bounds that plaintiffs seek to set, means that underwriters must act in
ways that will avoid not simply conduct that the securities law forbids (and will
likely continue to forbid), but also a wide range of joint conduct that the
secunties law permits or encourages (but which they fear could lead to an
antitrust lawsuit and the risk of treble damages). And therein lies the problem.
127 S. Ct. at 2396.
32 In BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, the Court held that
The [$2 million] sanction imposed in this case cannot be justified on the ground
that it was necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether less
drastic remedies could be expected to achieve that goal. The fact that a
multimillion dollar penalty prompted a change in policy sheds no light on the
question whether a lesser deterrent would have adequately protected the interests
of Alabama consumers.
517 U.S. 559 584 (1996); see also id. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[L]arger damages would 'over-
deter' by leading potential defendants to spend more to prevent the activity that causes the economic
harm ... than the cost of the harm itself."); Browning-Ferns Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The threat of such
enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products.").
33. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001) (warning against
"overdeterrence"); TVT Records v. The Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 429-30
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd, 412 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v.
Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., 193 Conn. 208, 237 (1984) (referencing the "prospect of [punitive] damages
assessed in such a manner may have a chilling effect on desirable conduct"); Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel
Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2077 (1998) ("[A] risk of extremely high awards is likely to produce
excessive caution in risk-averse managers and companies. Hence unpredictable rewards create both
unfairness and ... inefficiency, in a way that may overdeter desirable activity.") (citations omitted); A
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages. An Economic Analysis, Il1 HARV. L. REV.
869, 919 (1998) (excessive punitive damages might cause overdeterrence); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social
[Vol. 4:1
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commentators in the punitive damages context seem to disregard such
concerns. In Philip Morris v. Williams, for instance, several distinguished
professors filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff, contending that,
"if the conduct is truly reprehensible, there is no deterrence-based argument
for putting a ceiling on a criminal penalty or the punitive damages
award."34 And many courts reviewing punitive damages awards emphasize
the significance of deterring the reprehensible conduct in the case at hand,
with nary a mention of the prospect of overdeterrence.35 Indeed, a search
for the term "overdeter!" among the more than 750 decisions citing State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,36 a seminal recent
punitive damages opinion that discusses constitutional limits on the amount
of punitive damages and sets forth other instructional and evidentiary
limitations on punitive-damages proceedings, 3 7 produces only three hits,
and one of those was not even in the punitive damages portion of the
opinion!38 A search for the term "chill!" produces a few more hits, yet
even then all but two are off-point.39
The lack of concern about overdeterrence in the punitive damages
context is very problematic. After all, the amount of punitive damages can
far exceed "treble damages" (i.e., a punitive award of two times the
compensatory damages). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell, for instance, the jury awarded $145 million in punitive
damages and $2.6 million in compensatory damages for insurance bad-
faith.4' Even after the compensatory award had been reduced to $1 million
and the Supreme Court held the $145-million punitive award
constitutionally excessive, the Utah Supreme Court still upheld $9 million
Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285,
287, 324-25 (1998) (concluding that there are no "systemic differences in the safety and environmental
performance between states with punitive damages and states without them" and explaining that
"punitive damages promote counterproductive spending and wasteful precautions that may lead to
increased risk") (capitalization altered).
34. Brief Amicus Curiae of Keith Hylton et al. in Support of Respondents at 14, Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256 (U.S. Sept. 2006).
35 See, e.g., Action Manne, Inc. v. Continental Carbon Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1318-22 (1 1th Cir.
2007); Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561, 597 (Mont. 2007).
36. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). As of October 3, 2007, Westlaw's "citing references" listed 752
decisions citing State Farm.
37 See generally Lauren R. Goldman & Nickolai G. Levin, State Farm at Three: Lower Courts'
Application of the Ratio Guidepost, 2 N.Y.U J.L. & BUS. 509 (2006) (analyzing the 199 cases
involving an excessiveness challenge that were issued between April 2003 and April 2006).
38. See TVT Records, 279 F. Supp. 2dpassim; Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 449
(7th Cir. 2007); Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 2007 WL 1443114, at *14 (E.D. Ark. May 16, 2007).
Search results are current as of October 3, 2007.
39 See MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. Memberworks, Inc., 872 A.2d 423, 445 (Conn.
2005) (Zarella, J., dissenting); Accounting Outsourcing, LLC. v. Verizon Wireless Pers. Commc'ns,
L.P., 329 F.Supp.2d 789 (M.D. La. 2004). Search results are current as of October 3, 2007.
40. 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003).
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in punitive damages on remand." Likewise, in the most recent Supreme
Court case addressing punitive damages awards, Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, the jury awarded $79.5 million in punitive damages for fraud,
even though the amount of harm caused was about $821,000, a ratio of
approximately 97: 1.24
Furthermore, some of the underlying standards are highly, if not
completely, subjective. Consider, for instance, the following standards
governing underlying tort liability, punitive liability, and punitive amount:
A. TORT LIABILITY:
* "A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe-that is, if
the product is so likely to be harmful to (persons, property)
that a reasonable person who had actual knowledge of its
potential for producing injury would conclude that it should
not have been marketed in that condition. 43
* To establish tortious interference with a contract, plaintiff
must prove that defendant "intentionally disrupted or
interfered with the performance of this contract" and harmed
plaintiff.44
* An insurer is guilty of bad faith if it "unreasonably [failed to
pay/delayed payment of] policy benefits" and that
unreasonable failure was a "substantial factor" in causing
harm to the plaintiff.
45
41. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409, 410-11 (Utah 2004).
42. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007); see also Action Marine, Inc. v. Continental Carbon Inc., 481
F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding $17.5-million punitive award that was over nine times
compensatory damages of $1,915,000); In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F 2d 600 (9th Cir. 2006) (allowing
$2.5 billion in punitive damages for Exxon Valdez Tanker disaster where compensatory damages were
over $500 million); Eden Elec., Ltd. v. Amana Co., L.P., 370 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2004) (allowing $10
million in punitive damages for fraud though compensatory damages were $2.1 -million); White v. Ford
Motor Co., No. CV-N-95-279-DWH (VPC) (D. Nev. Mar. 15, 2005), rev'd. 312 F.3d 998 (9th Cir.
2002) (upholding $52 million punitive award for design defect causing $2,305,435 in damages); Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Barber, 149 S.W.3d 325 (Ark. 2005) (upholding $25-million punitive award that was
approximately five times compensatory damages of $5. 1-million); Bullock v. Philip Morris Inc., 42 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 140, 151 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding $28-million punitive award for fraud that was 33
times compensatory damages of $850,000); Boeken v. Philip Moms Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638 (Cal.
App. 2005) (allowing $50 million in punitive damages for fraud that was nine times compensatory
damages of $5.5-million); Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc., 76 P.3d 669 (Or. App.), modified on
reconsideration, 78 P.3d 908 (Or. App. 2003) (allowing $3.5 million in punitive damages though
compensatory damages were $500,000); Mission Res., Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust, 166 S.W.3d 301
(Tex. App. Corpus Chnsti 2005) (upholding $10 million in punitive damages for subsurface trespass
that was over eighteen times the compensatory damages of $543,776).
43. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, Strict Liability § 2:141 (2007).
44. ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, Action for Interference with Contractual or Business
Relations, § IOA.16 (2007).




" "Punitive damages may be awarded if you find by clear and
convincing evidence that [the defendant] acted maliciously,
fraudulently, willfully or wantonly with conscious disregard
for probable injury, or with gross negligence or
oppressiveness that was not the result of a mistake of fact or
law, honest error or judgment, overzealousness, mere
negligence, or other human failing."46
* Punitive damages may be awarded "if you find the conduct of
[Defendant] was [or amounted to]: Fraud; Oppression;
Malice; or Wanton or reckless disregard of another's rights. 47
* "If you find that the defendant's conduct was willful and
wanton and proximately caused injury to the plaintiff, and if
you believe that justice and the public good require it, you
may [award punitive damages].'48
C. PUNITIVE AMOUNT:
* "You may award punitive damages in any amount you believe
will serve to punish the defendant and will deter the defendant
and others from like conduct in the future. 4 9
* "The law provides no fixed standards for the amount of
punitive damages you assess, if any, but leaves the amount to
your sound discretion.
5 0
" "[Y]ou may... grant [Plaintiff] punitive damages in such
sum as you reasonably believe will punish [Defendant], and
be an example to others."5'
Fair Dealing-Failure or Delay in Payment-Essential Factual Elements, § 2331 (2007)
46. INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Punitive, § 11.100 (2007).
47. OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION, Exemplary or Punitive Damages (Prior Law) OUJI-
C1 § 5.5 (2002). This instruction was recently deemed unconstitutional in light of Philip Morris USA v.
Williams. See Moody v. Ford Motor Co., 2007 WL 869693, at *27-28 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2007).
48. ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Punitive / Exemplary Damages - Willful and Wanton
Conduct § 35.01.
49. INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Punitive (Exemplary Damages) § 11.100.
50. ARIZONA PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES INSTRUCTIONS, Punitive Damages, RAJI (Civil) 4th
Personal Injury Damages 4 (2005). There are some additional optional instructions stating that "you
may consider the character of defendant's conduct or motive, the nature and extent of the harm to
plaintiff that defendant caused, and the nature and extent of defendant's financial wealth." Id.
51. OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Exemplary or Punitive Damages (Prior Law),
Winter 2008]
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* "If you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you
must take into consideration the character and degree of the
wrong as shown by the evidence in the case, and the necessity
of preventing similar wrongs."52
* "The measure of [punitive damages] is your enlightened
conscience as an impartial jury."53
These instructions leave enough wiggle-room to allow a jury to reach
almost any result it desires. There is a particular tendency for juries to take
cost-benefit calculations out of context. Even though "cost-benefit analysis
is fundamental to the design engineer's trade" and omnipresent in
business,54 jurors have often distorted their significance, levying huge
punitive awards even though "some risks appear unavoidable"55 and
consumers are not willing to pay to eliminate others.56 In Flax v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., for example, a passenger was killed after a
Chrysler minivan was rear-ended.57 The jury found a seat in the minivan
insufficiently rigid and awarded $98 million in punitive damages, even
though the seat's design easily satisfied the applicable Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard and other juries had found the seat non-
defective-and, in fact, that a more rigid seat would increase the risk of
injury in other types of collisions.58 The district court that reviewed the
punitive award concluded that Chrysler's conduct was "indeed
reprehensible" because Chrysler "was aware that its yielding minivan seats
were causing death" without in the slightest adverting to the deaths that
would have been caused had more yielding seats been used.59 Many judges
and juries have reasoned similarly, inferring malice from a corporation's
OUJI-CI § 5.5 (2002).
52. ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEE, Punitive Damages: Definition and
Purpose, APJI § 23.21 (2006).
53. GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, VOL. 1, Punitive Damages; Measure, §
66.741 (2007).
54. David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24 (1982).
55. Robert S. Adler, Redesigning People Versus Redesigning Products: The Consumer Product
Safety Commission Addresses Product Misuse, I I J. L. POL. 79, 79 (1995)
56. STEPHEN J. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
13-14 (Harvard University Press 1994) (1993) ("It seems unlikely that the public would pay 24 to 60
times more per car to save far fewer lives."); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis. A Reckless
Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 561 (2000) ("At some point, the cost of additional safety improvements
becomes so great that additional safety measures are not worthwhile.").
57. 2005 WL 1768725 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. June 20, 2005).
58. Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 740 (10th Cir. 1996).
59. 2005 WL 1768725, at *3. This example was taken from the Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Alliance Automobile Manufacturers in Support of Petitioners, Philip Moms USA v. Williams, 127
S.Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256). For other chilling examples from the automobile industry, see pp. 8-
12 of that amicus brief.
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mere awareness of a risk-and calling the action highly reprehensible
because death or other physical harm resulted-regardless of whether the
corporation actually behaved rationally in failing to eliminate the potential
hazard.6"
Fear of inordinate punitive awards has led many businesses to
discontinue helpful products. Vaccinations and general aviation aircrafts
are two well-known examples.61 But they are certainly not unique.62
Indeed, the threat of multi-million dollar punitive awards may have
contributed to the decline in silicone breast implants as well.
63
In short, overdeterrence is a serious problem in punitive damages
litigation but one that receives scarcely any attention, especially in
comparison to its reception in other fields, such as antitrust. While I can
conceive of various reasons for the disparity in treatment, none, in my
view, are ultimately persuasive.
First, one could argue that the underlying deterred conduct simply is
not as socially beneficial in the punitive-damages context as in the antitrust
context. That is to say, antitrust law is concerned with deterring good,
procompetitive conduct. But in punitive damages litigation, the
purportedly deterred conduct is not "good" (even if not highly egregious).
The evidence, however, does not support such a distinction. There
have never been any studies comparing the "false positives" rate in antitrust
and punitive damages litigation, much less assessing the desirability of the
conduct that was erroneously condemned. Moreover, as the vaccinations
60. See Viscusi, supra note 56, at 566 ("[Uindertaking [cost-benefit] analysis and making a
conscious design to forego the improvement will subject a company to the charge that it 'deliberately
intended to injure the plaintiff."'); Owen, supra note 54, at 23 ("The decision to market a product in a
certain condition with certain risks may have been a good one because the expected benefits were great,
and the product may not have been legally defective at all, yet . . the manufacturer remains subject to
punishment for 'disregarding' the lesser risk by proceeding to sell the product with any danger
whatsoever.").
61. For vaccinations, see DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE
DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW. TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 241-42 (Oxford University Press 1996);
Louis C. Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug Development, in THE
LIABILITY MAZE 336 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., The Brookings Institution 1991);
Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive Damages Versus New
Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395, 1397 (1989). For aircraft, see W. KIP VisCUsi, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 8 (Harvard University Press 1991); Stephen C. Kenney, Punitive Damages in Aviation
Cases: Solving the Insurance Coverage Dilemma, 48 J. AIR L. & COM 753, 767 (1983); and Donald
M. Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and Punitive Damages: The Insurance
Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. AIR L. & CoM. 595, 619 (1974).
62. See, eg., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 33, at 882 (explaining that "a firm might be induced
to withdraw its product from the marketplace even though consumers place a higher value on the
product than its full cost of production, which includes the average harm caused by the product"); see
also Perez v. Z. Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that exorbitant
damages awards "tend to discourage participation in the underlying economic activity").
63. See Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding $6.5-
million punitive award on top of $840,000 in compensatory damages).
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and aircraft examples show, punitive damages can deter socially beneficial
conduct too.
Objectors sometimes will concede the problem of overdeterrence in
product liability cases but claim that no such predicament arises with
respect to intentional torts. This was the position of the professors who
supported the plaintiff in Philip Morris USA v. Williams: if a
"reprehensible" act was "intentional," then overdeterrence could not
occur.
64
But even that attempted limitation suffers from serious difficulties.
For one, there still is the risk of erroneous determinations. According to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which many states follow, "intent" can
be proven either by a desire to achieve a certain result or by knowledge to a
substantial certainty that the result could result from one's actions.65 Mere
performance of a cost-benefit analysis and a decision not to eliminate risks
in their entirety can potentially satisfy that latter standard.
For another, the conduct comprising the intentional tort may be only a
small part of a larger enterprise creating commercial value. Unless the fix
is sufficiently cheap, the only way to eliminate the tort would be to curtail
the underlying activity. In that sense, it may be "good" for the
manufacturer to continue the enterprise but compensate for the harm
caused.66
Finally, there is the problem of causing corporations to spend too
much to eliminate the misbehavior. As Professors Shavell and Polinky
have explained, "[t]he problem of wasteful precautions can apply even to
intentional acts ... [because] corporations could be led to spend excessive
policing., 67 If a punitive award is large enough, it will cause corporations
to misallocate resources toward the elimination of the harm instead of
where they might be used more productively.68
64. Brief Amicus Curiae of Keith Hylton et al. in Support of Respondents at 15, Philip Moms
USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-381).
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); see also Baska v. Scherzer, 156 P.3d 617,
623 (Kan. 2007) (explaining that "an actor will be held liable for an intentional tort if the plaintif's
injuries were the natural and probable consequence of [the defendant's] intended actions.") (internal
citations omitted); Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 698 A.2d 838, 851 (Conn. 1997) ("In defining
intent, we have stated that 'intent refers to the consequences of an act ... [and] denote[s] that the actor
desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or that he beheves that the consequences are substantially
certain to follow from it."') (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965)); Spivey v. Battaglia,
258 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1972) ("Where a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was
substantially certain to follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it.").
66. This logic is supported by the age-old Learned Hand test for negligence. Under that test, a
defendant is liable only if the expense of taking a precaution is less than the expected harm from
forgoing it. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
67. Amicus Curiae Brief of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell and CATO Institute in Support of
Petitioner at 10, Philip Moms USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-381).
68. This phenomenon is acute in the medical profession. "Many scholars attribute the costly
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A second potential objection could focus on the source of the court's
authority for considering overdeterrence in a given case. After all, most
punitive damages are awarded pursuant to state or federal statutes. Few, if
any, of those statutes mention the need to protect against overdeterrence or
anything directly along those lines. Rather, they speak of the need to
provide an amount that deters others, without any reference to not awarding
an amount that "overdeters." While the same is true about the Sherman
Act, the argument goes, that statute is written in such general terms that
courts have the ability to interpret it an economically sensible manner.69
This argument suffers from several difficulties. The first is that many
tort and punitive liability standards are just as general as the Sherman Act,
so the distinction between contexts does not really hold. Another is that
punitive damages are not paid with Monopoly money. The dollars used to
pay punitive damages awards are an established property interest that can
be taken only in accordance with due process of law.7" For this and similar
reasons, the Constitution prohibits punitive awards that are "grossly
excessive" in amount.7' Overdeterrence is a factor that can be used to make
the excessiveness determination.72
Moreover, even independent from the ultimate amount of punitive
damages, the Supreme Court in Williams stressed the constitutional
significance of "assur[ing] the jury will ask the right question, not the
wrong one."73 It seems elementary that, if juries are being asked whether
punitive damages are necessary to deter others (and if so how much), they
also should be considering the possibilities that such awards may overdeter,
as part of asking the "right question." If juries are not going to be so
instructed, the various liability and amount standards that the juries are
applying should at least be framed in such a way to minimize the amount of
phenomenon of defensive medicine-the use of tests and diagnostic procedures that cost more than
their expected health benefits-to excessive damages in medical malpractice cases." Id. at 9-10 (citing
Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?, Il1 Q.J. ECON. 353
(1996)).
69 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007)
("From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute."); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981) ("In antitrust, the federal courts. . act
more as common-law courts than in other areas governed by federal statute.").
70. See, eg, Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994) ("Punitive damages pose an
acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property.").
71. See Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1062. ("[T]his Court has found that the Constitution imposes certain
limits, in respect both to procedures for awarding punitive damages and to amounts forbidden as
'grossly excessive."'); State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) ("To the
extent [a punitive] award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an
arbitrary deprivation of property."). This article does not attempt to provide a "first principles" defense
of the substantive constitutional limitations on the amount of punitive damages but accepts the existing
precedent as legitimate.
72 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584 (1996) (discussing the need to consider
whether a "lesser deterrent" might suffice).
73. 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
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beneficial conduct that is deterred as a result of their imposition.
A third potential objection can focus on the purpose of punitive
damages: to punish and deter. An objector might argue that the award
would be insufficiently punitive if the amount were scaled back to prevent
overdeterrence.
This objection, however, begs the question of how much money is
needed for the punishment to be adequate. As the Court noted in Williams,
current punitive damages awards-which can be in the eight, nine, or even
ten figures-are often "many times the size of [punitive] awards in the 18th
and 19th centuries."74  While the increasing prevalence of gargantuan
punitive damages awards tends to desensitize people to amount and to
encourage more of an upward spiral, the Supreme Court has attempted to
curtail the amount of punitive damages, noting in BMW that even a punitive
award of $2 million is "tantamount to a severe criminal penalty."75
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed the need for caution
before presuming that an amount of punishment chosen by jury and/or upheld
by a reviewing court is appropriate. "What we are concerned with, is the
possibility that a culpable defendant may be unjustly punished; evidence of
culpability warranting some punishment is not a substitute for evidence
providing at least a rational basis for the particular deprivation of property
imposed by the State to deter future wrongdoing. 7 6 Moreover, "[a]lthough
[punitive damages] awards serve the same purposes as criminal penalties,
defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded
the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding. 7 7 In fact, "where the
amounts are sufficiently large," federalism concerns arise, because large
punishments "may impose one State's (or one jury's) 'policy choice,' say as to
the conditions under which (or even whether) certain products can be sold,
upon 'neighboring States' with different public policies. '78 Together, these
various concerns suggest that, in many cases, a "more modest punishment for
[the] reprehensible conduct could [satisfy] the State's legitimate objectives,"
and, if so, the court "should [go] no further.,
79
1II. POSSIBLE REMEDIES
There are several ways that the overdeterrent effect of punitive
damages could be lessened. First, as suggested by Weyerhaeuser itself,
74. Id.
75. 517 U.S. at 585.
76. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 429 (1994).
77. State Farm, 538 U S. at 417.
78 Williams, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.
79. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419-20.
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courts could adopt more objective standards to govem punitive liability and
punitive amount and incorporate those standards into their jury instructions.
For instance, courts could develop more "safe harbors" through which
particular conduct may sail without being subjected to punitive damages.
One "safe harbor" adopted by some courts is to preclude punitive damages
for product design decisions made against the backdrop of a genuine
dispute in the engineering community about the relative merits of
competing design alternatives.8° Another "safe harbor" (at least in several
states) is that there can be no punitive damages when the defendant has
complied with industry custom81  or applicable state and federal
regulation.8" These examples could be expanded to embrace other
situations in which the defendant had a reasonable basis to believe that its
conduct was legal.
Another possibility is to provide juries guidance about the amount of
punitive damages that marks the constitutional maximum in a variety of
circumstances (of course after the qualifier that the jury is free not to
impose any punitive damages or to award an amount less than the
maximum, if it so desires). An easy way to provide this guidance would be
to read to the jury the "ratio" discussion from State Farm:
[I]n practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will
satisfy due process. ... [A]n award of more than four times the amount
80. See, e.g., Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1995).
81. See, e.g., Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 589 (Tex. App. 1996), rev'd on other
grounds, 967 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1998), where the court stated:
When a seller relies in good faith on the current state of the art in safety
concerns, and on conclusions by governmental agencies charged with
administenng safety regulations in [the] area of its product that [its] product is
not unreasonably dangerous, it cannot be said to have acted with an entire want
of care showing conscious indifference to the safety of product users, or to have
acted with conscious indifference to an extreme degree of risk.
Id; cf Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp., 21 F.3d 1048, 1059 (11th Cir. 1994) ("Furthermore,
Appellant's compliance with both federal regulations and industry practices is some evidence of due
care"); Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1198 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[W]hether or not
Tiffin followed industry standards and complied with the state of the art while designing the motor
home is probative on the issue of the wantonness, willfulness and maliciousness of their acts").
82. See, e.g, Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079, 1096 (Mont. 2007) ("A
good-faith effort to comply with all government regulations 'would be evidence of conduct inconsistent
with the mental state required for punitive damages."') (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F.
Supp. 566, 584 (W.D. Okla. 1979)); Alcorn v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 50 S.W.3d 226, 249 (Mo. 2001)
("[C]onformity with the regulatory process does negate the conclusion that the railroad's conduct was
tantamount to intentional wrongdoing. There was not a submissible case for punitive damages.");
Miles, 922 S.W.2d at 589 ("When a seller relies in good faith on ... conclusions by governmental
agencies ... that [its] product is not unreasonably dangerous, it [does not act] with ... indifference to
the safety of product users, or. . . with conscious indifference to an extreme degree of risk."); cf Geier
v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 893 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that auto
manufacturer's compliance with safety regulations "would presumably weigh against an award of
punitive damages").
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of compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional
impropriety. [Moreover, there is] a long legislative history, dating back
over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions of
double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish[,] [which
though] not binding [is] instructive....
[A larger ratio may be allowed] where 'a particularly egregious act
has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages' [or] where
'the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic
harm might have been difficult to determine.' The converse is also
true, however. When compensatory damages are substantial, then a
lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach
the outermost limit of the due process guarantee. The precise award in
any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of
the defendant' conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.
83
Another way to lessen the overdeterrent effects of punitive damages
awards is to tighten corporate liability requirements. Some jurisdictions
have something called the "vice-principal" rule. Under this rule, "a
corporation may not be held liable for punitive damages for gross
negligence unless the corporation itself commits gross negligence,
authorized or ratified an agent's gross negligence, was grossly negligent in
hiring an unfit agent, or committed gross negligence through the actions or
inactions of a vice-principal.,8 4  "'Vice principal' encompasses: (a)
corporate officers; (b) those who have authority to employ, direct, and
discharge servants of the master; (c) those engaged in the performance of
nondelegable or absolute duties of the master; and (d) those to whom the
master has confided the management of the whole or a department or a
division of the business."5  Adopting these sorts of requirements
diminishes the overdeterrent effect of punitive awards by diminishing the
need for wasteful precautions monitoring the conduct of lower-level
employees.
Finally, the overdeterrent impact of punitive damages awards could be
lessened by instituting more rigid caps on punitive amount and limiting the
83. 538 U.S. at 425.
84. R & R Contractors and R & R Oil Field Servs., Inc. v. Torres, 88 S.W.3d 685, 708 (Tex. App.
2002).
85. Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas v. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 854-55 (Tex. App. 2003); see
also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(b) (punitive liability against a corporation can rest only on the conduct of
a "an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation"); White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563,
566-67 (1999) (construing § 3294(b) to define a "managing agent" as a supervisor "who [has] broad
discretionary powers and exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority in the corporation"); Schropp v.
Crown Eurocars, 654 So.2d 1158, 1159 (Fla. 1995) (punitive damages award against corporation must
be based on the conduct of a managing agent, primary owner, or another whose acts may be deemed the
acts of the corporation). Cf Kolstad v. Amencan Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999) (In the
punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the discriminatory
employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good
faith efforts to comply with Title VII.).
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situations in which "unlimited" punitive damages are available. In short,
the less the possible liability, or the more a business can limit the amount of
punitive damages to a modest sum, the less businesses will feel the need to
forgo beneficial or benign conduct simply out of fear of exorbitant punitive
damages.
These various measures are not just encouraged by Weyerhaeuser but
also are fully supported the Supreme Court's exhortation in Philip Morris
that States develop "proper standards that will cabin the jury's
discretionary authority" to prevent unconstitutionally excessive awards.86
These various proposals will not eliminate the overdeterrence problem, but
they would be a good start.
IV. CONCLUSION
Punitive damages are a powerful tool that serves an important role in
policing and preventing egregious conduct. But there are many attendant
risks that require added caution in their imposition, including a risk of
overdeterrence. A comparison of punitive-damages cases and commentary
with antitrust cases and commentary-and the Weyerhaeuser decision in
particular-suggests that this risk should be considered more seriously in
punitive damages litigation.
86. 127 S Ct. at 1062 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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